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This paper is an essay in philosophical ontology tasked with defending a 
constructionist
1
 approach to race.  Anthony Appiah, in his In My Father's House: Africa 
in the Philosophy of Culture
2
, argues that the concept of race is an “empty concept” 3 
precisely because it is both a semantic and an ontological fiction.  He advises us to 
segregate race to the realm of the vague and fuzzy because all racial discourse, which he 
claims must transcendentally presuppose a biological notion of race in order to be 
meaningful, seductively misleads us to the extent that such discourse presupposes that the 
term "race" names a natural kind.
4
  While identifying the concept of race as deficient, he 
challenges us to learn “to think beyond race.”5  His rebuke of race as a dysfunctional 
concept takes the form of casting race as a virus spreading the contagion of bad thinking, 
that is, delusional, even paranoid thinking.  
  
This paper argues that while Appiah's theoretical interrogation of the concept of 
race is mainly accurate, race, nevertheless, is meaningful from a socio-cultural 
perspective
6
.  Discourse about race need not require that races exist in the sense of being 
natural kinds.  Race, I shall be arguing, is a construction, i. e., human agents with varied 
interests, purposes, and linguistic resources devise the conditions of meaningfulness for 
the term "race".   
 
The general structure of the paper is as follows.  I first present a critical discussion 
of Appiah’s view on race by examining his realist view of meaning and reference. Next, I 
critically review his main arguments against the concept of race.  In part two of the essay, 
I offer a discussion of constructionism.  I describe this position, offer examples, and say 
why it more adequately accommodates a defense of the concept of race by treating it as a 
socio-historical construction rather than a scientific natural kind.  It is obvious that I 
challenge Appiah’s realist view that a meaningful concept is one that is intelligible and 
that the deciding grounds of the intelligibility is a matter of a concept referring to 
something that has existence.  Meaningful concepts refer to objects whereas meaningless 
concepts do not refer to anything that has being. 
 
PART I: Realism and Appiah’s Rejection of Race 
 
In executing his attack against race, Appiah recruits realist semantical and 
ontological presuppositions about truth and reference.  Let us briefly examine these 
assumptions about truth and reference.  Being a realist, he believes that the same general 
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theory of truth must be uniform and applicable to all systems of discourse.  Consistency 
requires that our interest in truth entail applying the same realist procedures of analysis to 
all systems of discourse.  We establish truth by analyzing statements in terms of truth 
conditions and not assertability conditions.  This semantics parity imposes the 
requirement that we give an account of truth conditions by appealing to the objects or 
entities a discourse is ontologically committed to.  Thus, on this view, we should subject 
the following sentences to the same parallel treatment: 
 
(1) The cat is on the mat. 
(2) New York City is bigger than the city of Boston. 
(3) 2+2=4 
(4) The X race is more intelligent than the Y race. 
 
Consistent with a realist analysis the truth (1) requires the positing of, minimally 
speaking, a cat and a mat; (2) requires the positing of cities; (3) requires the existence of 
abstract objects, namely, numbers; and, finally, (4) requires the existence of  certain kinds 
of objects, namely races.  
 
Realists embrace the correspondence theory of truth.  This commitment by realists 
evidences their partiality to an inflationary conception of truth which, minimally 
construed, treats the truth predicate as a matter of correspondence, agreement or, rather, 
of confrontation, between ideas, beliefs, propositions, or sentences and extra-linguistic 
reality. 
  
Appiah's assumptions about reference, truth and knowledge are, as I have been urging, 
uncompromisingly realist in orientation.  Perhaps it would help to summarize these 
assumptions at this point, keeping in mind that the battle between realist and nonrealists 
turns on the referentially transparent and referentially opaque.  Call it realism, 
metaphysical realism or Platonism, the view essentially presupposes the following picture 
of things. 
 
One starts with assumption of a specifiable ontology—that the world consists of a 
definite totality of discourse-independent objects and properties.  In relation to 
these objects one assumes a bivalent logic of excluded middle—each object either 
has or has not any property meaningfully applicable to it.  One then operates with 
a truth-based epistemology—the world is described by language through the 
principle of correspondence, in which properties correspond to collections of 
objects, and statements are either true or false, depending on whether the states of 
affairs they correspond to are ‘really’ the case--that is, whether these states either 
do or don’t obtain in the world.7 
 
 In conjunction with the above mentioned realist orthodoxy, Appiah recruits the 
causal theory of reference.  The Causal theory of reference does not provide an account 
of the referent of a word (proper name) in terms of the term satisfying a set of 
descriptions.
8
  A causal link between a word and an object establishes successful 
reference.  More specifically, the connection between a word and a thing depends on a 
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baptismal ceremony performed by a community of language users.  This dubbing 
activity, directly linking a word and an object, is transmitted from one generation to 
another through a causal chain.  The term rigidly designates the object in any possible 
world. 
 
 Applying this notion of causal reference to natural kind terms, Kripke, the leading 
architect of the causal theory, maintains that natural kinds terms, such as "gold", "water" 
and "tiger" are rigid designators, that is, these terms pick out the same object in every 
possible world.  Furthermore, these natural kind terms pick out or rigidly designate 
objects in virtue of the objects in question possessing certain essential properties.  So that, 
for example, any substance lacking the atomic number 79 is not gold even if it is 
perceptually indistinguishable from gold.  The causal theory of reference therefore courts 
essentialism.  This essentialism holds that natural kinds are identified because they 
possess certain essences; and it is in terms of these essences that we can correctly claim 
that the world determines the referent of a term.  Let us turn now to Appiah’s rejection of 
race. 
 
Argument From Classification 
 
Racialism, according to Appiah, infers that, 
 
... there are heritable characteristics, possessed by members of our species, which 
allow us to divide them into a small set of races, in such a way that all members 
of these races share certain traits and tendencies with each other that they do not 
share with members of any other race.  These traits and tendencies characteristic 
of a race constitute, on the racialist view, a sort of racial essence; it is part of the 
content of racialism that the visible essential heritable characteristics of the 'races 
of Man' account for more than visible morphological characteristics - skin color, 
hair type, facial features-on the basis of which we make our informal 
classifications.
9
 
 
But Appiah correctly considers racialism a vulgar and false position.  There really 
are no races, he tells us, precisely because, among other things, there is no nonarbitrary 
way of effectively classifying human beings into groups with sharply defined boundaries.  
For if we were to use human physical characteristics as criteria for individuating races, 
then any arbitrary and insignificant set of physical characteristics will qualify as criteria 
for classifying individuals into groups.  Clearly, if such classification is arbitrary, then the 
notion of race is insignificant precisely because it will be possible to individuate races on 
the basis of meaningless criteria.  Finally, even if the criteria of classification are 
conservative in scope, there will be numerous individuals who will not fit into any 
classification scheme.  Indeed, the mere fact that some individuals defy classification, on 
the basis of race, violates one common mark of a precise concept.  A precise concept, in 
order to avoid being vague, should either determinately apply or not apply to an object or 
an individual.  As Appiah states: 
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The classification of people into "races" would be biologically interesting if both 
the margins and the migrations had not left behind a genetic trail.  But they have, 
and along that trail are millions of us (the numbers obviously depending on the 
criteria of classification that are used) who can be fitted into no plausible scheme 
at all.  In a sense, trying to classify people into a few races is like trying to classify 
books in a library: you  may use a single property--size, say--but you will get a 
useless classification, or you may use a more complex system of interconnected 
criteria, and then you will get a good deal of arbitrariness.  No one--not even the 
most compulsive librarian!-- thinks that book classifications reflect deep facts 
about books.
10
  
  
Appiah next discusses the premature journey of the concept of race from a folk 
concept to its unqualified role as a technical scientific concept; but he claims that the 
more technical notion serves no real significant biological purpose.  As a folk concept, 
being a fuzzy concept like the folk concept of the mind or sensation, the concept of race 
suffered the fate of having been embedded within a folk theory about human races.  As 
the scientific concept of race displaced the folk theory of race, races were no longer 
classified in terms of observable physical characteristics.  Instead racial classification 
depended upon the existence of identifiable racial essences, that is, genetic traits or 
molecular structures.  But, according to Appiah, no identifiable racial essences exist.  He 
concludes as follows with regard to the concept of race: 
 
The appeal of race as a classificatory notion provides us with an instance of a 
familiar pattern in the history of science.  In the early phases of theory, scientists 
begin, inevitably, with the categories of their folk theories of the world, and often 
the criteria of membership of these categories can be detected with the unaided 
senses.  Thus, in early chemistry, color and taste played an important role in the 
classification of substances; in early natural history, plant and animal species were 
identified largely by their gross visible morphology.  Gradually, as the science 
develops, however, concepts are developed whose application requires more than 
the unaided senses; instead of the phenomenal properties of things, we look for 
"deeper," more theoretical properties.  The price we pay is that classification 
becomes a more specialized activity; the benefit we gain is that we are able to 
make generalizations of greater power and scope.  Few candidates for laws of 
nature can be stated by reference to the colors, tastes, smells, or touches of 
objects.
11
 
 
Since there are no essences that individuate races, racial classification, 
particularly in terms of gross morphological features, really does not serve any significant 
biological purpose.  Appiah reinforces this point when he writes: 
 
To say that biological races existed because it was possible to classify people into 
a small number of classes according to their gross morphology would be to save 
racialism in the letter but lose it in the substance.  The notion of race that was 
recovered would be of no biological interest--the interesting biological 
generalizations are about genotypes, phenotypes, and their distribution in 
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geographical populations.  We would just as well classify people according to 
whether or not they were redheaded, or redheaded and freckled, or redheaded, 
freckled, and broad-nosed too, but nobody claims that this sort of classification is 
central to human biology.
12
 
 
The lack of racial essences, that is, essences existing in the world, Appiah 
maintains, renders the racial classification and the general notion of race insignificant.  
He states that "in the absence of racial essences, there could be no guarantee that some 
particular person was not more gifted [...] than any or all others in the population of other 
regions.
13
  So, on Appiah’s view, the concept of race fails to do the work many thinkers 
commonly expect it to perform. Put differently, the concept of race does not qualify to 
function as a valid concept and we should not extend to it any semantic privileges.  
Appiah continues in exposing the semantic incompetence and ontological poverty of the 
concept of race, for he adds that even if there were really races in the world, and if 
sharing a racial essence determined membership in a race, knowing an individual's race 
still would not yield information about the cognitive abilities or the moral character of an 
individual.  Once again, Appiah writes, "The conclusion is obvious: given a person's race, 
it is hard to say what his or her biological characteristics (apart from those that human 
beings share) will be, except in respect of the ‘grosser’ features of color, hair, and bone 
(the genetics of which is, in any case, rather poorly understood)-- features of 
‘morphological differentiation,’ as the evolutionary biologist would say.”14  The message 
is clear: Race cannot overcome its suspect semantic status through regimes of 
classification premised on racial essences. 
 
The Difference Argument 
 
Appiah also examines certain issues within the philosophy of biology and 
concludes that there can be no constructive definition of race chiefly in terms of 
biological differences.  This conclusion follows from the fact that there are no major 
significant biological differences between two human beings taken at random from the 
human population and two (white) people taken from the population of England.  And the 
above will hold for a comparison between a person taken from the population of Africa 
and a person taken from the population of Europe.
15
  Appiah's point is quite simple: if 
physical differences among human beings were of any real biological significance, then 
there should be recognizable and specific differences which would clearly distinguish one 
race from other races.  However, no substantial physical differences exist capable of 
underwriting variations in cognitive, moral and creative abilities which would, obeying 
the laws of nature, warrant separating human beings into clearly defined groups called 
races. Appiah concludes that: 
 
The underlying statistical facts about the distribution of variant characteristics in 
human populations and subpopulations are the same, whichever way the matter is 
expressed.  Apart from the visible morphological characteristics of skin, hair, and 
bone, by which we are inclined to assign people to the broadest racial categories-
black, white and yellow-there are few genetic characteristics to be found in the 
population of England that are not found in similar proportions in Zaire or in 
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China; and few too which are found in Zaire but not in similar proportions in 
China or in England.
16
 
 
In pulling together his critical insights and having already done much to establish 
the hopeless pathological condition of the concept of race, Appiah reaches a final 
conclusion: 
 
The truth is that there are no races: there is nothing in the world that can 
do all we ask race to do for us.  "...[E]ven the biologist's notion has only 
limited uses, and the notion that Du Bois required [sociohistorical], and 
that underlies the more hateful racisms of the modern era, refers to nothing 
in the world at all.  The evil that is done is done by the concept, and by 
easy - yet impossible - assumptions as to its application.
17
  
 
For Appiah, then, there is a certain ethics of semantic that we should adopt; failure to 
adopt this ethics in the case of race makes us guilty of a certain theoretical as well as 
physical evil. 
 
It is indisputable that Appiah presupposes a correspondent notion of truth and a 
realist referential analysis of sentences in his attack against the idea of race.  He points 
out that (1) we lack necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of the concept 
race; (2) for any given criteria of classification of races there will be many people who do 
not fit into these classification; (3) most racial classifications are arbitrary and are not 
biological significant; and (4) there are no racial essences in the physical world.  These 
four considerations, from a realist referential analysis, render sentences about races false 
since there are no races, that is, there are no mind independent entities described by such 
statements. 
 
PART II: An Alternative Approach to Race 
 
Appiah presents us with a challenge.  Indeed, he denies any possible dialectic 
caress between his realist semantics and ontology and the concept of race.  There seems 
to be no possibility of any dialectical synthesis between race and realism.  We must 
decide whether to follow Appiah’s lead and eliminate from our conceptual scheme 
concepts that fail to yield necessary and sufficient conditions of meaning.  For example, 
consider the political concept of equality.
18
  This concept does not admit to a necessary 
and sufficient definition that is universally acceptable to philosophers.  But lacking a 
necessary and sufficient definition of equality has not and does not support eliminating 
the concept of equality on the grounds that it is semantically suspect.  Can we not treat 
the concept of race in a similar manner? 
 
 Appiah takes us only half way.  His leadership threatens to deliver us to a barren 
semantic desert and not the semantic promise land, freed of the plague of the dangerous 
concept of race.  His efforts to splice the semantically valid from the semantically invalid 
on the altar of biology fail.  
 7 
Although I agree with Appiah’s conclusion of race not being a valid biological 
concept, I do not support the almost perfunctory move to deny the plausibility of attempts 
to rehabilitate race, assuming that one believes race needs rehabitation because of its 
semantical delinquency, or to offer an alternative account of race on the grounds that 
either option ignores that race is semantically retarded and, consequently, beyond 
semantic and ontological redemption.  Here, I argue in support of an alternative 
conception of race, one immune to the various problems correctly attributed to the 
mistaken assumption that the only possible justification of the concept of race should take 
the form of a biological defense along realist lines, the tendency to assume that scientific 
concepts provide the most effective model for what should counts as a genuine concept.  
Indeed, it is this persistent belief about race that often encourages charges of playing the 
race card when race gets theorized differently or attempts are made to employ race as a 
plausible category of analysis in situation where phenomenon would otherwise remain 
cognitively opaque.   
 
Constructionism and Race 
 
In the wake of Appiah’s surgical dismantling of race, I firmly support a 
reconstruction of race along the lines of a constructionist account of race and consider 
this approach explanatory privileged.  I will be calling my approach constructionism.
19
  I, 
however, distance my version of constructionism from the vulgar constructionism now in 
vogue.  According to the vulgar view, to say that X is a construction means that X is not 
real; X is artificial.  There is also the assumption that establishing the constructedness of 
X makes X false.  Finally, some believe that no one construction is better than any 
another.
20
   
 
It is not my intention here to provide a robust ontological theory or to completely 
distinguish all the possible conceptions of constructionism.  Nor is it my concern at this 
time to critically consider the implications of constructionism itself being a social 
construction.
21
  I seek only to  hint at the possible benefits a constructionist ontology can 
offer with regard to certain concepts.  My version of constructionism is not an 
egocentrism tenaciously committed to the idea that isolated individuals can 
spontaneously create kinds without answering to any authority.  Neither is it the thesis 
that groups of individuals can randomly create or rather will into existence the fantastic 
contents of their minds.  I understand constructionism as a thesis about the existence of 
certain objects, entities, institutions and practices, etc.  Here existence is not construed in 
terms of things being absolutely and totally independent of the mind but rather in terms 
of human activities, choices, values, actions, intentions etc.  However, bracketing the 
notion of existence as being totally mind independent need not deny that constructions 
have some degree of permanency external to thought. 
 
Consciousness, according to constructionism, constitutes the varied objects and 
entities causally linked to belief formation, as well as those objects anchoring the 
transactions between human beings and the world.  Note that here I must confess to 
shifting between two senses of the term “the world”.  There is a sense in which there is a 
natural world, which is not the product of consciousness.  However, there is no dualism 
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here in the sense of consciousness existing outside the world.  Consciousness is already 
in the world.  Or better yet, there is an intense dialectical interplay between consciousness 
and the natural world.  We can also talk about the world in the sense of the world being 
something constituted, namely, a web or circuits of relationships, meanings, and signs.  It 
is in this latter sense that we can talk about consciousness constituting the social world 
without flirting with views which hold that we can change reality by simply changing our 
thinking or that we can make things cease to exist by not thinking about them.  Since I 
am somewhat apprehensive with talk about creating the world, I am more inclined to talk 
in terms of social reality as an achievement. 
 
Constructionism, philosophically speaking, is then antiessentialist with regard to 
ontology, antirealist with regard to semantics, and antifoundationist with regard to 
epistemology.  My view of constructionism is consistent with Ian Hacking’s description.  
Constructionism, according to him, are the “various sociological, historical, and 
philosophical projects that aim at displaying or analyzing actual, historically situated, 
social interactions or causal routes that led to, or were involved in, the coming into being 
or establishing of some present entity or fact. “22 
 
Certain insights are complicit in bringing forth constructionism.  The physical 
world, ontologically speaking, is indeterminate precisely because the world in and of 
itself, totally independently of consciousness, is without any distinctions, categories, or 
differences, in short, without negations.  Second, consciousness is a reality.  
Consciousness is, first, intentional, for all acts of thinking are about or rather are directed 
at something.  Besides its intentionality, consciousness is also meaning-creating activity.  
Consciousness does not simply passively represent the world, but confers meaning upon 
objects.  In perceiving, we simply do not see an object disinterestedly, but we see it as 
such and such.  The intentionality of consciousness and its meaning-creating feature 
suggest that were it not for consciousness, there would no differentiations or distinctions 
in the realm of being.  But consciousness does not impose differentiations and 
distinctions meaninglessly.  Consciousness slices up the world in harmony with its 
concerns and projects.  It is this activity of cutting up that is the metaphysical foundation 
of the existence of distinctions; it is the origins of our ontological categories as well as 
our numerous ontologies.  Furthermore, we can, without too much exaggeration, say that 
categorization has great adaptive utility. 
 
The ontological thesis of constructionism is not exclusively applicable to socio-
cultural categories.
23
  Constructionism may very well be a characteristic feature of the 
interaction among consciousness, language and the “world.”  Indeed, we can find 
constructionism at work in the philosophy of mathematics.  There we find the idea that all 
fields of mathematics can be reduced to or modeled in set theory.  If this assumption is 
correct, then matters of economy suggest that instead of having a plurality of entities in 
mathematics, -numbers, points, functions, functionals, and sets, - it would be preferable 
to have only sets.  But since there is the claim that numbers are objects and that 
mathematical objects are sets, then it should be possible to say which sets number really 
are.  But in mathematics there are two reductions of numbers to sets that are 
incompatible.  On the Von Neumann’s account, 2 is a member of 4 and according to 
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Zermelo, 2 is not a member of 4.  Faced with this reduction problem, some thinkers reject 
realism in mathematics and deny that numbers are objects.   
 
While resisting any involvement with the realist program to decisively establish 
numbers as mind independent abstract objects capable of discovery through mathematical 
activity, mathematical constructionists, while following in the tradition of Kant’s notion 
of the a priori intuitions of space and time, maintain that number is an apriori intuition 
required for the possibility of counting.  Furthermore, being antirealists, they insist that 
we are only justified in believing in the existence of a mathematical truth or object only if 
we have constructed a proof.  Here we have a conception of mathematics opposed to the 
traditional view of mathematics as a timeless enterprise, a view of mathematical truths as 
eternal.  For constructionists, mathematics takes place in time.  Numbers exist only to the 
extent that we have a proof for them; they are constructed through the enterprise of proof 
construction, namely constructed by mental operations.  According to Heyting: 
 
[W]e do not attribute an existence independent of our thought ,i.e., a 
transcendental existence, to the integers or to any other mathematical 
objects….[M]athematical objects are by their very nature dependent on human 
thought.  Their existence is guaranteed only insofar as they can be determined by 
thought.  They have properties only insofar as these can be discerned in them by 
thought….  Faith in transcendental …existence must be rejected as a means of 
mathematical proof.
24
 
 
Indeed, Brouwer proudly proclaimed that “to exist’ means nothing more than to 
be constructed; exist and constructed are, accordingly, synonymous.  Let us turn to 
another case of constructionism. 
  
Some would argue that the appeal to constructionism is not only philosophically 
wrong-headed but out right irrational, for in challenging realism in semantic and 
ontology, we are denying the authority of logic.  If the powerful strategies of realism 
undermine the claimed validity of a concept, one such as race, philosophical scruples 
dictate that we eliminate this concept from our discourse if for no other reason than to 
avoid holding false beliefs.   
  
The appeal to logic, hence, the requirement of rationality, does not pose an 
immediate problem for constructionism.  Indeed, Nelson Goodman has championed 
constructionism precisely because he thinks that logic would be ontologically impaired 
without it.  He maintains that “ without some techniques for applying symbolic logic to 
extra-logical subject matter, problems that require symbolic logic will never yield clear 
and precise solutions.”25  Goodman tells us that the subject matter that makes it possible 
for symbolic logic to realize its potency is kinds.  Interestingly enough, he does not 
restrict kinds to only natural kinds, those kinds with mind independent essences 
supposedly existing totally independently of human beings.  Goodman prefers to talk 
about relevant kinds.  He writes: 
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I say ‘relevant’ rather than ‘natural’ for two reasons: first, ‘natural’ is an inapt 
term to cover not only biological species but such artificial kinds as musical 
works, psychological experiments and types of machinery; and second, ‘natural’ 
suggests some absolute or psychological priority, while the kinds in question are 
rather habitual or devised for a purpose.
26
 
 
Far from simply discovering kinds already existing in the world, we create kinds 
for a purpose: a clear case of constructionism.  World construction, according to 
Goodman, is an imposing feature of human existence such that we can, in this context 
and, without exaggeration, talk about multiworld existence.  There is no such thing as, on 
his view, discovering a world, he finds favor with talk about ways of world making.  
Consistent with such talk, Goodman radicalizes realist talk about the correspondence of a 
belief to reality, maintaining that there can only be correspondence to a reality under 
some particular description; “there is no one way the world is.”  Accordingly, he states 
that “without the organization, the selection of relevant kinds, affected by evolving 
tradition, there is no rightness or wrongness of categorization, no validity or invalidity of 
inductive inference, no fair or unfair sampling, and no uniformity or disparity among 
samples.”27  The close connection between the creation of kinds and normative 
judgments reinforces the plausibility of constructionism as an alternative to the 
promotion of realism in semantics and ontology as the only justified defense against 
relativism.  Relativism is considered a profound threat to the objectivity of truth and 
knowledge.  I have said enough about constructionism.  We need to return to the issue of 
race. 
 
 As I have been maintaining, unlike Appiah’s claim that race is semantically and 
ontologically suspect, as well as being biological invalid, race is best understood as a 
constructed category, making it a socio-historical construction.
28
  Put differently, race 
“should be understood as a social category whose definition makes reference to a broad 
network of social relations, and it is not simply a matter of anatomical difference.”29  This 
socio-historical view of race dictates that classification of people into races need not be 
dependent upon the prior existence of biological essences.  In advancing this 
constructionist view of race, following Hacking, I, too, support the transition in focus 
from semantics to focus on dynamics, meaning by dynamics the critical investigation of 
the construction, deconstruction, evolution, and maintenance of race through the stream 
of time. 
  
 Hacking advocates what he calls dynamic nominalism, the view that kinds of 
people come into existence when certain categories are created.  He argues that certain 
kinds of people are constructed or, as he puts it, "made up."  He is not claiming that that 
people are made in a manner similar to how automobiles are made.  We do not make up 
people from the appropriate biological raw materials.  People are made up or constructed, 
on Hacking's view, by falling under social and cultural categories.  The people made up 
by these social and cultural categories are historical and not natural.  In the context of this 
essay, Hacking’s dynamic nominalism truly captures the tradition of race creation that 
has been such a pervasive feature of modern life.  He maintains that 
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[p]eople are alive or dead, tall or short, strong or weak, creative or plodding, 
foolish or intelligent.  These categories arise from the nature of people 
themselves, although we are by now well aware how "intelligence" can be 
wrapped by quotients.  But consider the categories so much worked over [...], 
involving madness, criminality and other kinds of deviancy.  Consider [...] what a 
soldier was in medieval times, and what he became with the new institutions of 
discipline and uniform: soldiers themselves became different kinds of people.  We 
may begin to grasp at a different kind of nominalism, which I call dynamic 
nominalism.  Categories of people come into existence at the same time as kinds 
of people come into being to fit those categories, and there is a two-way 
interaction between these processes.
30
 
 
 One virtue of constructionism is its capacity to accommodate  a vigorous defense 
of the idea of the contestability of concepts, the view that certain concepts, particularly 
those of a socio-cultural nature are essentially contested, meaning that there is no general 
agreement about how to define these concepts and, consequently, different people will 
necessarily define these concepts differently.  Once we focus on the dynamics of 
contestability we will be better able to understand the social and political conflicts 
dominating our political landscape.   
 
Explaining their theory of racial formation, Michael Omi and Howard Winant 
write that “racial formation emphasizes the social nature of race, the absence of any 
essential racial characteristics, the historical flexibility of racial meanings and categories, 
the conflictual character of race at both the ‘micro-‘ and ‘macro-social ‘ levels, and the 
irreducible political aspect of racial dynamics.”31  This notion of race as a social 
formation captures the dynamics of change that would prevent any treatment of race as a 
natural kind.  And here the vortices of contestation that throw race into the turbulence of 
political conflict indicate the folly in limiting the analytical relevance of race to a 
restricted biological function. 
  
Indeed, the concept of race claims a certain inescapable analytical relevance with 
regard to our understanding of certain things.  Understanding the history of new world 
societies would be almost impossible were it not for the analytical explanatory vigor of 
race.
32
  This analytical explanatory enterprise is not dependent on the prior biological 
validity of race but is, I believe, viable to the extent that race is one of the major 
categories of classification used to structure systems of privileges, among other things, in 
the modern world.  Indeed, race can help us better understand certain aspects of our 
current political reality that are otherwise obscured by the individualist framework of 
modern political thought.
33
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